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Are There Environmental Benefits from Driving Electric
Vehicles? The Importance of Local Factors†
By Stephen P. Holland, Erin T. Mansur, Nicholas Z. Muller,
and Andrew J. Yates*
We combine a theoretical discrete-choice model of vehicle purchases,
an econometric analysis of electricity emissions, and the AP2 air
pollution model to estimate the geographic variation in the environmental benefits from driving electric vehicles. The second-best electric vehicle purchase subsidy ranges from $2,785 in California to
−$4,964 in North Dakota, with a mean of −$1,095. Ninety percent
of local environmental externalities from driving electric vehicles in
one state are exported to others, implying they may be subsidized
locally, even when the environmental benefits are negative overall.
Geographically differentiated subsidies can reduce deadweight loss,
but only modestly. (JEL D12, D62, H23, L62, Q53, Q54, R11)
For a variety of reasons, including technological advances, environmental concerns, and entrepreneurial audacity, the market for pure electric vehicles, which was
moribund for more than a century, is poised for a dramatic revival.1 Several models are already selling in considerable volumes, the portfolio of electric vehicles is
beginning to span the vehicle choice set, and almost all major manufacturers are
bringing new models to the market. The Federal Government is encouraging these
developments by providing a significant subsidy for the purchase of an electric vehicle, and some states augment the federal policy with their own additional subsidy.2
Proponents of these subsidies argue electric vehicles generate a range of
short-term and long-term benefits such as reduced environmental impacts, innovation

* Holland: Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Bryan School of Business
and Economics, Bryan 462, PO Box 26170, Greensboro, NC 27402, and NBER (e-mail: sphollan@uncg.edu);
Mansur: Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, 100 Tuck Hall, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, and
NBER (e-mail: erin.mansur@dartmouth.edu); Muller: Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Warner Hall
305E, Middlebury, VT 05753, and NBER (e-mail: nmuller@middlebury.edu); Yates: Department of Economics and
Curriculum for the Environment and Ecology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB 3305, Chapel Hill,
NC 27599 (e-mail: ajyates@email.unc.edu). We thank Gregory Grissom and Jacob Cruger for research assistance.
Helpful comments and suggestions were provided by Joseph Aldy, William Chernicoff, Matthew Kahn, Jeremy
Michalek, and Joseph Shapiro, several anonymous referees, seminar participants at Connecticut, Carnegie Mellon,
Williams, Maryland, and Harvard, and conference participants at POWER, NBER, SEA, USAEE, TE3, and ASSA.
Special thanks to Gloria Helfand, David Brzezinski, and Shawn St. Clair for data.
†
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150897 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s).
1
http://energy.gov/articles/history-electric-car (accessed October 17, 2016).
2
Internal Revenue Code Section 30D (Notice 2009-89) provides a tax credit of up to $7,500.
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spillovers, and reduced reliance on imported oil.3 In this paper we analyze whether
electric vehicles do indeed generate short-term environmental benefits by examining
air pollution damages from driving gasoline vehicles and charging electric vehicles.
In particular, we focus on the importance of local factors by including global and
local pollution, spatial heterogeneity of damages, pollution export across political
jurisdictions, and policy that may vary by location.
Three main considerations motivate our analysis. First, prior studies of electric
vehicles have focused on calculating the emissions of electric vehicles but have not
had a conceptual framework for analyzing electric vehicle subsidies.4 We analyze a
model of vehicle choice, which gives us the theoretically sound and intuitive result
that the subsidy should be equal to the difference in lifetime damages between an
electric vehicle and a gasoline vehicle. Our theoretical framework also allows us to
address additional policy questions regarding the best policies for different jurisdictional levels and the welfare gains from policy differentiation.5
Second, despite being treated by regulators as “zero emission vehicles,” electric
vehicles are not necessarily emissions free (see, for example, National Academy of
Sciences 2010). In 2014, the US Department of Energy reported that nearly 70 percent of electricity generated in the United States is produced by burning coal and
natural gas. In many locations, the comparison between a gasoline vehicle and an
electric one is really a comparison between burning gasoline or a mix of coal and
natural gas to move the vehicle. However, average emissions of regional power
plants can be a misleading indicator of the environmental impact of electric cars
because all power plants do not respond proportionally to an increase in electricity
usage and because electricity flows do not respect regional (e.g., state) boundaries.6
To assess the emissions from charging an electric vehicle, we use an econometric
model to estimate the effect of charging an electric vehicle on the marginal emissions of multiple pollutants at each power plant.7
Third, there are significant physical differences between emissions from gasoline
and electric vehicles. This is due to the distributed nature of the electricity grid,
the height at which emissions occur, and the chemistry of fuel combustion. As a
result, pollutants and emissions rates may be spatially distinct even if gasoline and
electric vehicles are driven in the same place. For local pollutants, an additional
problem is that the same vehicle driven in different places leads to different damages. For this reason, many prior studies consider only carbon dioxide.8 We use an
integrated assessment model to value damages across local and global pollutants for
both e lectric and gasoline vehicles.9

3
http://energy.gov/eere/vehicles/ev-everywhere-grand-challenge-does-10-year-vision-plug-electric-vehicles
(accessed October 17, 2016).
4
See, for example, Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Michalek et al. (2011).
5
Examples of theoretical discrete choice transportation models include De Borger (2001); De Borger and
Mayeres (2007); and Parry and Small (2005). Differentiated policy is analyzed by Weitzman (1974); Mendelsohn
(1986); Banzhaf and Chupp (2012); and Fowlie and Muller (2013).
6
The EPA’s calculated CO2emissions rates for electric vehicles (www.fueleconomy.gov) are regional averages.
7
This builds on Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Holland and Mansur (2008).
8
See, for example, Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Archsmith, Kendall, and Rapson (2015).
9
Previous air pollution integrated assessment research includes Mendelsohn (1980); Burtraw et al. (1998);
Mauzerall et al. (2005); Tong et al. (2006); Fann, Fulcher, and Hubbell (2009); Levy, Baxter, and Schwartz (2009);
Muller and Mendelsohn (2009); and Henry, Muller, and Mendelsohn (2011). We model both ground-level emissions
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Addressing these three considerations yields a powerful modeling framework for
analyzing electric vehicle policy. In particular, our study is the first to consider the
geographic variation in damages from both local and global pollutants emitted by
both gasoline and electric vehicles and to tie this variation to a choice model.10 This
framework enables us not only to evaluate the environmental benefit of electric cars,
but also to address questions of political economy and fiscal federalism.
Our first set of results documents the considerable heterogeneity in the environmental benefits of an electric vehicle relative to a gasoline vehicle. These benefits can be large and positive, large and negative, or negligible, depending on the
location. For example, California has relatively large damages from gasoline vehicles and a relatively clean electric grid, which implies large positive environmental
benefits of an electric vehicle. These conditions are reversed in North Dakota. The
variation in the sign of the environmental benefits stems almost entirely from local
air pollution. If we account only for greenhouse gases, then electric vehicles are
superior to gasoline vehicles almost everywhere. Using our model, we determine
the welfare maximizing subsidies on electric vehicle purchases. We refer to these
subsidies as second-best, but we stress that they only account for the relative differences in environmental impacts from driving electric and gasoline vehicles in
the short run. Even in locations like California, subsidy values are significantly less
than the current federal subsidy. The national average subsidy for the purchase of an
electric vehicle is estimated to be −$1,095. Thus, on average in the United States,
the second-best purchase policy is a tax, not a subsidy.
Our second set of results shows the remarkable degree to which electric vehicles
driven in one location lead to environmental externalities in other locations. At the
state level, 91 percent of local pollution damages from driving an electric vehicle are
exported to states other than the state in which the vehicle is driven. In contrast, only
19 percent of local pollution damages from driving a gasoline vehicle are exported to
other states. This discrepancy casts doubt on the efficacy of policy selected by local
regulators. It is not obvious whether a given state will consider full damages (damages across all states), or only native damages (those damages which actually occur
in the given state) when setting policy. Moreover, state regulators face incentives in
current air pollution policy that emphasize within-state consequences of emissions.
The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) emphasize compliance with
ambient pollution limits within states. Although there are constraints on the extent
of exported pollution, especially from power plants, the NAAQS clearly encourage
local compliance. This leads state regulators to focus on in-state damage and hence
prefer a technology that exports pollution to other regions. The difference between
using full and native damages in determining the second-best subsidy may be considerable. Accounting for full damages, the second-best subsidy is positive in 11 states.
Accounting for only native damages, the s econd-best subsidy is positive in 32 states.
and power plant emissions throughout the contiguous United States. In contrast to prior work, we report damages
within the county of emission, within the state of emission, and in total (across all receptors).
10
Babaee, Nagpure, and DeCarolis (2014); Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014); Michalek et al. (2011);
and Tessum, Hill, and Marshall (2014) analyze the benefits of electric vehicles at the aggregate level. Li et al. (forthcoming) consider variation in damages from electric vehicles but assume uniform damages from gasoline vehicles.
Grissom (2013) considers variation in damages from gasoline vehicles but does not account for local pollution
from electric vehicle charging. Archsmith, Kendall, and Rapson (2015) assess the life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG)
benefits from electric vehicles.

VOL. 106 NO. 12

holland et al.: Environmental Benefits of Electric Vehicles

3703

The final set of results assesses the deadweight loss of various policies as well
as the welfare gains from differentiated policy. Our theoretical analysis reveals that
the welfare gains from differentiated subsidies depend on the higher order moments
of the distribution of environmental benefits. Calibrating this model gives us an
estimate of the magnitude of these gains. For electric vehicle subsidies, we find
large deadweight loss and small welfare gains from differentiation. For taxes on
gasoline miles, we find small (or zero) deadweight loss and larger welfare gains
from differentiation.
There are several important caveats to our calculation of the environmental benefits of electric vehicles. First, it only captures air pollution emissions associated with
driving or charging the vehicles. It does not account for “upstream” environmental
externalities associated with producing either fuels or vehicles. Second, it is based
on the electricity grid in the years 2010–2012 and current gasoline vehicle technology.11 Over time, both the grid and gasoline vehicles may become cleaner. Third, it
depends on marginal emissions from an increase in the demand for electric power
to charge electric vehicles. This may not be appropriate when electric vehicles comprise a substantial fraction of the vehicle fleet. Fourth, it ignores p reexisting environmental polices such as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards
and cap-and-trade markets for various local pollutants. For each of these caveats,
we consider the degree to which they affect our calculated environmental benefits.
For example, accounting for CAFE standards leads to an additional environmental
cost of $1,555 per vehicle, whereas if there were a binding cap on SO2 the additional
environmental benefit would be $2,280 per vehicle.
With these caveats in mind, our main results show that the subsidy for electric
vehicles is not justified by environmental benefits. But, as noted above, there are
other arguments in favor of electric vehicle subsidies. Perhaps most important is the
possibility of the long-term benefits due to a combination of innovation spillovers,
learning by doing, and dynamic changes to the electricity grid. Any such long-term
benefits may be at least partially offset by the short-term costs associated with current electric vehicle use. Our analysis provides an estimate of these s hort-term costs.
Moreover, by shedding light on issues related to differentiated regulation and pollution export, we provide a policy framework for subsequent analysis of long-term
issues.
In Section I we develop a simple general equilibrium model that includes discrete choice over vehicle type as well as environmental externalities from driving. In
Section II we describe the methods by which we determine emissions and damages
from electric and gasoline vehicles. Section III presents the results. In Section IV we
discuss the caveats to our analysis. Section V concludes.
I. Theoretical Model

Consider a theoretical discrete choice transportation model in which consumers
in the market for a new vehicle choose between a gasoline vehicle and an electric

The emissions inventory used by our integrated assessment model (AP2) is from 2011. These are the latest
years for which all data are available.
11
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vehicle.12 Consumers obtain utility from a composite consumption good x  (with
price normalized to one) and from miles driven over the life of the selected vehicle,
either gasoline miles gor electric miles e. We allow for several policy variables. The
government may provide a subsidy sfor the purchase of an electric vehicle, place
a tax tg  on gasoline miles, a tax te  on electric miles, or some combination of these
policies.13 We hold fuel and vehicle prices fixed.14
The indirect utility of purchasing a gasoline vehicle is
   x + f (g) such that x + ( pg    + t g  )g = I − pΨ
    ,
	
Vg    = max
x, g
where pΨ
  is the price of the gasoline vehicle, p g  is the price of a gasoline mile, I  is
income, and fis a concave function. Likewise, the indirect utility of purchasing an
electric vehicle is
   x + h (e) such that x + ( pe    + t e  )e = I − ( pΩ    − s) ,
	
Ve    = max
x, e
where pΩ   is the price of the electric vehicle, pe  is the price of an electric mile, and h 
is a concave function. Any difference in attributes between the gasoline and electric
vehicle are captured by differences in the functions fand g. Because the objective
function in these optimization problems is quasi-linear, there are no income effects.15
Following the discrete choice literature, we assume that the choice of vehicle is
influenced by i.i.d. random variables ϵ gand ϵe drawn from a common extreme value
distribution with zero expected value and standard deviation that is proportional to
a parameter μ.16 Accordingly, we define
	
g  = V g  + ϵg  ,
and
	
e  = V e  + ϵe  .
A consumer selects the gasoline vehicle if g  > e. This occurs with probability

exp (Vg    / μ)
___________________
	
π ≡ Probability(g  > e  ) =  
  
      .
exp (Vg    /μ )  + exp (Ve    /μ)
The expected utility of a new vehicle purchase is given by
	
E[ max[ e   , g   ]] = μ ln(exp (Ve  /μ) + exp (Vg  /μ)).

Examples of general discrete choice models are Anderson, Palma, and Thisse (1992) and Small and Rosen
(1981). Applications to transportation models are De Borger (2001) and De Borger and Mayeres (2007). In online
Appendix A, we extend the model to include several vehicles of each type.
13
Alternatively, we might consider a tax on fuel consumption. These taxes are equivalent in our model, but may
not be equivalent in a model with multiple vehicles of each type. See Fullerton and West (2002).
14
This is consistent with a model in which vehicles and miles are produced by price-taking firms using constant
returns to scale technology.
15
The marginal utility of income is equal to one, the number of miles driven does not depend on income, and
the choice of vehicle does not depend on income.
16
The variance is μ
   2 (3.14159 )  2  / 6.
12
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Consumers create negative environmental externalities by driving, but ignore the
damages from these externalities when making choices about the type of vehicle and
number of miles. In our empirical analysis, gasoline vehicles emit several pollutants
from their tailpipes and electric vehicles cause emissions of several pollutants from
the smokestacks of electric power plants that charge them. Because the damages
from these pollutants may be global or local, we introduce multiple locations into
the model.
A. Uniform versus Differentiated Regulation
Let mdenote the number of locations and let α
 i denote the proportion of the total
population of new vehicle buyers that resides in location i. An important feature of
our model is that driving in one location may lead to local damages in that location,
as well as local damages in other locations. Accordingly, we define full damages
due to driving in location ias the sum across all locations of local damages plus the
global damages. Assuming that both global and local damage functions are linear
allows us to characterize full damages with a single variable for each type of vehicle.17 Let δ gidenote the marginal full damages (in dollars per mile) from driving a
gasoline vehicle in location i , and δe idenote the marginal full damages (in dollars
per mile) from driving an electric vehicle in location i.
We determine welfare maximizing purchase subsidies under both uniform regulation (the same policy applies to all locations) and differentiated regulation (policy
may vary from location to location). Because the first-best policy in our model is
differentiated Pigouvian taxes on both types of miles, we refer to the welfare maximizing subsidies as second-best.18
First we study differentiated regulation. Here there are mlocal governments that
select location-specific purchase subsidies. Let Ri  denote the expected government
revenue generated by the purchase of a new vehicle in location i.19 For the moment,
we assume local government icares about full damages due to driving in location i .
It selects the purchase subsidy si  to maximize the welfare i associated with the
purchase of a new vehicle within location i , defined as the sum of expected utility
and expected revenue less expected pollution damage:20
	
i   = μ(ln (exp (Vei  /μ) + exp (Vgi  /μ))) + Ri    − ( δgi πi  gi    + δei  (1 − πi  ) ei    ).
Optimizing the welfare function gives the following proposition (all proofs are in
online Appendix A).

17
Constant marginal damages is consistent with the EPA’s social cost of carbon calculations as well as prior
research on local air pollution (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009; Fowlie and Muller 2013).
18
Results for uniform taxes on miles are in online Appendix B.
19
Alternatively we could have a single revenue equation and assume that a central government makes the
location-specific policy choices. But, given our subsequent distinction between full and native damages, it is natural
to consider distinct local governments.
20
Because there are no income effects, the consumer component of welfare is equivalent to the standard notion
of compensating variation (Small and Rosen 1981).
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Proposition 1: The second-best differentiated subsidy on the purchase of the
electric vehicle in location iis given by s  i∗   where

  gi    − δei ei  ) .
	
s i∗   = (δgi

The term δgi gi    − δei ei  is simply the difference between the full damages over the
driving lifetime of a gasoline vehicle and the full damages over the driving lifetime
of an electric vehicle.21 Even if the electric vehicle emits less pollution per mile
than the gasoline vehicle, the sign of the subsidy is ambiguous, because the number of miles driven may be different. If the miles driven are indeed the same, and
the electric vehicle emits less pollution per mile than the gasoline vehicle, then the
subsidy is positive. We refer to the difference δg i  − δeias the environmental benefits
of an electric vehicle. This concept assumes that the number of miles driven by the
two types of vehicles is the same (an assumption we will maintain in most of the
empirical section below).
Next we study uniform regulation. Here a central government selects a uniform
subsidy that applies to all mlocations. The government’s objective is to maximize
∑  αi  Wi   , which is the weighted average of welfare across locations. The next proposition delineates the s econd-best uniform subsidy. It also describes an approximation
formula for the welfare gain in moving from uniform regulation to differentiated
regulation.
Proposition 2: Assume that prices, income, and the functions h and gare the
same across locations. The second-best uniform subsidy on the purchase of an electric vehicle is given by s ̃ , where

	
s  
   )g − (∑ αi  δei
   )e).
̃ = ((∑ αi  δgi

Furthermore, let (S  ∗) be the weighted average of welfare from using the
 (S̃ )be the weighted
second-best differentiated subsidies s i∗   in each location and let 
average of welfare from using the s econd-best uniform subsidy s̃  in each location. To
a second-order approximation, we have
1   π(1 − π ) __
1    (1 − 2π) ∑ α  (s  ∗   − s̃ )  3 ,
  1   ∑ αi  (s i∗   − s̃ )  2  −  ___
(S  ∗) − (S̃ ) ≈  __
i i
2
(μ
)
μ  2
where π
  is evaluated at the uniform subsidy.
These results are most easily interpreted in the special case in which the population of new vehicle buyers is the same in each location (αi   =  _n1 )and the electric
vehicle and gasoline vehicle are driven the same number of miles (g = e).22 Here
the s econd-best uniform subsidy s̃ is equal to the average environmental benefits
21
The formula for s i∗  has a simple structure because there are two vehicles in the choice set. If the choice set is
larger, then s  i∗  will depend on the various cross-price elasticities (see online Appendix A).
22
To test the robustness of the results in Propositions 1 and 2, we also analyze a model in which consumers
make a continuous choice between gasoline and electric miles. See online Appendix C.
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multiplied by the number of miles driven. And the approximate welfare gain from
differentiation is a function of the second and third moments of the distribution of
the environmental benefits. To understand these results, consider marginal welfare
in region i:
∂  π(1 − π)
   − δei
 )).
	  ____i   =  _______
μ  (−si    + g(δgi
∂ si  
When set equal to zero in a first-order condition, the policy variable si  can be solved
for as a linear function of the environmental benefits. But the marginal welfare function itself is a nonlinear function of si   (through the variable π). If it had been linear
in s i   , then the approximate welfare gain from differentiation would not have been a
function of the third moment.23
Proposition 2 provides a point of comparison to previous work on differentiated
regulation. But the practical application of the approximation is limited because it
depends on the value of μ. Recall that this parameter is proportional to the standard
deviation of the random variables in the utility function. If we determine a value for
μ , either by an econometric procedure (Dubin and McFadden 1984) or by a calibration procedure (De Borger and Mayeres 2007), then we will generally be able to
determine the exact numerical value of the welfare gain, which eliminates the need
for an approximation.
B. Full versus Native Damages
So far we have assumed that local government iis concerned with the full damages caused by driving in location i. But this may not necessarily hold. For example,
when an electric vehicle is driven in Pennsylvania, regulators in Pennsylvania may
be more concerned about environmental damages which occur in Pennsylvania than
they are about downwind damages that occur in New York. To account for this possibility, it is useful to break up full damages into native damages (i.e., those damages
which occur in location i) and exported damages (i.e., those which occur in other
locations.)
If a local government only cares about native damages, then its objective is to
maximize
   (1 − πi)ei    ),
	̂ i   = μ(ln (exp (Vei    /μ) + exp (Vgi    /μ))) + Ri    − (δˆgi πi  gi    + δˆei

where δˆg i and δˆeiare the marginal native damages in location i due to driving a vehicle in location i . It follows from Proposition 1 that the s econd-best purchase subsidy
based on native damages, denoted by sˆ  ∗i   , is given by
	sˆ  ∗i   = (δˆ gi gi    − δˆ ei ei  ).

For more details and a comparison with Mendelsohn (1986), see online Appendix D. See also Jacobsen et al.
(2016).
23
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We would expect considerable heterogeneity across locations in the relationship
between native and full damages due to the various chemical and physical processes
that govern the flow of local pollution. In general, however, we would expect electric vehicles to export more pollution than gasoline vehicles, due to the distributed
nature of electricity generation as well as the fact that smokestacks release emissions much higher in the atmosphere than tailpipes. The greater the extent to which
the electric emissions are exported to other locations, the greater the extent to which
a given location may want to subsidize the purchase of an electric vehicle.
II. Calculating Air Pollution Damages

The theoretical model illustrates that the environmental benefits of an electric
vehicle arises from reduced damages relative to the gasoline vehicle it replaces. We
calculate this benefit by determining emissions per mile for electric and gasoline
vehicles, and then mapping emissions into damages, accounting for the fact that
both emissions and damages may differ by location. In these calculations, we use
the county as the basic unit of location. We first give an overview of our general
procedure, and then describe the details of our two component empirical models.
We consider damages from five pollutants: CO2, SO2, NOx, PM2.5, and VOCs.
These pollutants account for the majority of global and local air pollution damages
and have been a major focus of public policy.24 Our set of electric vehicles includes
each of the 11 pure electric vehicles in the EPA fuel efficiency database for the 2014
model year.25 Our set of gasoline vehicles is meant to capture the closest substitute
in terms of n on-price attributes to each electric vehicle. Wherever possible, we use
the gasoline-powered version of the identical vehicle, e.g., the g asoline-powered
Ford Focus for the electric Ford Focus.26
To determine the emissions per mile for each gasoline vehicle, we integrate data
from several sources.27 For CO2 and SO2, emissions are directly proportional to
gasoline usage, so we use conversion factors in the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated
Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation (GREET) model scaled.28 We differentiate urban and nonurban counties by using the EPA’s city and highway mileage.29
For NOx emissions, we use the Tier 2 emission standards for the vehicle “bin.” For
PM2.5 and VOCs, we combine the Tier 2 standards with GREET estimates of PM2.5
emissions from tires and brakes and VOC emissions from evaporation. The implication of this procedure is that emissions per mile for each gasoline vehicle only differ
across urban and nonurban counties.30
24
We do not analyze emissions of CO and toxics like mercury. Most CO emissions are from vehicles, and most
toxics are from power plants, so the direction of bias from these omissions is unclear.
25
The federal purchase subsidy depends on the size of the battery. All 11 pure electric vehicles are eligible for
the maximum subsidy of $7,500.
26
Survey data on new vehicle purchases provided by MaritzCX was used to verify that these choices were
reasonable. See online Appendix E for details.
27
We do not make state-level adjustments to car emissions, although fuel blend regulations in California have
been shown to improve air quality (Auffhammer and Kellogg 2011).
28
In the 2012 GREET model, developed by Argonne National Laboratory, the SO2 emissions rate is
0.00616 g/mile at 23.4 mpg. This is slightly higher than the Tier 2 allowed 30 ppm which would be
0.00485 g/mile at 23.4 mpg.
29
Urban counties are defined as counties which are part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).
30
The emissions per mile for our gasoline vehicles are reported in Table A in online Appendix E.

VOL. 106 NO. 12

holland et al.: Environmental Benefits of Electric Vehicles

3709

For electric vehicles, determining emissions per mile is more complicated. We
begin with the EPA estimate of mpg equivalent (i.e., the estimated kWh per mile).31
We adjust this figure to account for the temperature profile of each county, because
electric vehicles use more electricity per mile in cold and hot weather.32 Next we
use an econometric model (described below) to estimate the marginal emissions
factors (e.g., tons per kWh) for each of our pollutants at each of 1,486 power plants
due to an increase in regional electricity load. We combine these estimates with an
assumed daily charging profile to determine the emissions per mile at each power
plant due to the charging of an electric vehicle in a given county.33 The implication
of this procedure is that emissions per mile for each electric vehicle may differ
across any two counties.
Next we map emissions into damages. For CO2, we use the EPA social cost of
carbon of $41 per ton.34 For local pollutants, we use the AP2 model. This model
calculates damages per unit of a given local pollutant in each county (as described
below). By multiplying emissions per mile and damages per unit emitted, and then
aggregating across pollutants (and, for electric vehicles, across power plants) we
obtain the full damages per mile for each gasoline vehicle and each electric vehicle
in each county. As in the theoretical section, these full damages account for global
effects, local effects in the given county, and local effects in other counties.
To analyze any policy which affects multiple counties, we need a sense of the relative importance of driving in the counties. We weight all summary statistics using
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in each county, as estimated by the EPA for their
Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES).35
A. Econometric Model: Estimation of Marginal Emission Factors
from Electricity Use
To determine the emissions that result from electricity use to charge an electric
vehicle, we must determine which power plants respond (and how they respond) to
increases in electricity usage at different locations. The electricity grid in the contiguous United States consists of three main “interconnections”: Eastern, Western,
and Texas. Since there are substantial electricity flows within each interconnection
but quite limited flows between interconnections, we model each interconnection
separately. Within each interconnection, transmission constraints prevent the free
flow of electricity throughout the interconnection. Accordingly, we follow the North
31
We use the combined city/highway EPA figure and do not differentiate electric vehicles by urban and rural
since regenerative braking leads to smaller differences in city and highway efficiencies.
32
This is due to both the decreased performance of the battery and the increased demand for climate control
(Yuksel and Michalek 2015). Temperature has a smaller effect on the performance of gasoline vehicles, so we do
not adjust gasoline mpg for temperature. We model the electric vehicle range loss as a Gaussian distribution with
no range loss at 68ºF but a 33 percent range loss at 19.4ºF. See online Appendix G. We explore how sensitive our
findings are to this assumption, as well as others, in Section IIID.
33
We analyze eight charging profiles: our baseline profile using estimates from Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) (see Figure B in online Appendix F), a flat profile, and six profiles with n onoverlapping four-hour
charging blocks.
34
See “The Social Cost of Carbon,” EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon. We use the
year 2015, 3 percent discount rate estimate and convert it to 2014 dollars. Moreover, all monetary values in all
model components are also converted to 2014 dollars.
35
If vehicle life and miles driven per year per vehicle are the same across counties, then these weights are equivalent to the weights αi  (the number of new vehicle buyers) used in the theoretical model.
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American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and divide the three interconnections into nine distinct regions.36 We use these nine NERC regions to define the
spatial scale for measuring emissions per kWh. In particular, our estimation strategy
assumes that an electric vehicle charged at any county within a given NERC region
has the same marginal emission factors as an electric vehicle charged at any other
county within the same region.37
Our data consists of hourly emissions of CO2, SO2, NOx, and PM2.5 at
1,486 power plants as well as hourly electricity consumption (i.e., electricity load)
for each of our nine NERC regions, for the years 2010–2012.38 We use these data
to estimate the effect of electricity load on emissions, employing methods similar to Graff Zivin, Kotchen, and Mansur (2014) and Holland and Mansur (2008).
Like them, we allow for an integrated market where electricity consumed within an
interconnection may be provided by any power plant within that interconnection. In
contrast, however, we estimate the effect of changes in electricity load separately for
each power plant in the interconnection.
The dependent variable in our analysis, yi  t , is power plant i  ’s hourly emissions
(CO2 , SO2 , NOx, or PM2.5) at time t. For each power plant, we regress the dependent
variable on the contemporaneous electricity load in each of the regions within the
power plant’s interconnection. To account for different charging profiles, the coefficients on load vary by hour of the day. The regression includes fixed effects for each
hour of the day interacted with the month of the sample. We regress
24

J(i)

24

36

	
yi  t  =   ∑     ∑  βijh  HOURh    LOADj  t  +   ∑     ∑  αi hm  HOURh    MONTHm    + εit  ,
h=1 j=1

h=1 m=1

where J(i )equals the number of regions in the interconnection in which power plant
iis located, H
 OURh  is an indicator variable for hour of the day h  , MONTHm   indicates
month of the sample m , and LOADj  tis the electricity consumed in region jat time t.
The coefficients of interest are the marginal emission factors βijh , which represent
the change in emissions at plant ifrom an increase in electricity usage in region j  in
hour of the day h.
B. The AP2 Model: Determining Damages from Local Air Pollution
The AP2 model is an integrated assessment air pollution model.39 AP2 connects reported emissions (USEPA 2014) to estimates of ambient concentrations
using an air quality model. In particular, the air quality model maps emissions of
ammonia, NOx , SO2, PM2.5, and VOCs from each reported source of air pollution in the contiguous United States into ambient concentrations of SO2, O3, and
PM2.5 at all receptor locations (i.e., the 3,110 counties in the contiguous United
36

See online Appendix H for our procedure for assigning counties to NERC regions.
There are some data on electricity load at NERC subregions. Due to a high degree of multi-collinearity, our
estimation strategy would likely not work at this level of disaggregation.
38
CO2, SO2, and NOx data are directly from the EPA continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS). We
construct hourly PM2.5 from hourly generation and annual PM2.5 emissions rates. Power plant emissions of VOCs
are negligible. More details about this data are in online Appendix I.
39
See Muller (2011). More details of our implementation of AP2 are given in online Appendix I.
37
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States). The remaining components of AP2 then link these ambient concentrations to exposures, physical effects, and monetary damages. Welfare endpoints
covered by the model include: human health, crop and timber yields, degradation of buildings and material, and reduced visibility and recreation (Muller and
Mendelsohn 2007). Human exposures are calculated using c ounty-level population data for 2011 which are reported by the US Census. Crop and timber yields
are reported by the US Department of Agriculture. Damages associated with built
structures, visibility, and recreation contribute a very small share of total damage
(Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus 2011).
Exposures are translated into physical effects (e.g., premature deaths, cases
of illness, lost crop yields) using concentration-response functions reported in
the related literature. In terms of the share of total damages, the most important c oncentration-response functions are those governing adult mortality. We use
results from Pope et al. (2002) to specify the effect of PM2.5 exposure on adult
mortality rates and we use results from Bell et al. (2004) to specify the effect of
O3 exposure on all-age mortality rates.40 Mortality risks, which comprise the vast
majority of damage from local air pollution, are then expressed in terms of monetary terms using an $8.1 million value of a statistical life (VSL). Crop and timber
yield effects from pollution exposure are valued using 2011 market prices.
Because of the focus of this paper on small changes to the vehicle fleet, calculation of incremental damages p er-unit mass emitted is necessary. The algorithm
used to compute damages per ton herein has been used in prior research (Muller
and Mendelsohn 2009; Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus 2011). Briefly, this
entails the following steps. With all sources in the United States emitting at their
reported level in 2011, exposures, physical effects, and monetary damages are
computed. Then, for an emission from a particular power plant, AP2 adds one ton
of SO2 , for example, to reported emissions for 2011. Exposures, physical effects,
and monetary damage are re-computed. The incremental damages per-unit mass
is tabulated as the difference in monetary damage between the baseline case and
the add-one-ton case.
Importantly, in computing p er-unit emitted damages, AP2 aggregates the difference in damages across all county receptors affected by the additional ton. As
discussed above, local governments may be more concerned about native damages
rather than full damages. We use the AP2 model in a novel way to determine both
types of damages. To determine full damages, we follow the usual procedure and
aggregate damages at all receptors. To determine native damages, we only consider damages that occur at receptors within the state or county of interest. For
example, driving a gasoline vehicle in Fulton County, Georgia, creates a plume
of pollution concentrated in a few counties. Gasoline native damages for Fulton
County correspond to the portion of the plume that harms Fulton County. Driving
an electric car in Fulton County leads to an increase in emissions from various
power plants, as specified by the econometric model. The resulting plumes of
pollution cover a number of counties. Electric native damages for Fulton County
correspond to the portions of the plumes that harm Fulton County.

40

In our sensitivity analysis, we study a more recent concentration response function (Roman et al. 2008).
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Gasoline vehicle
damage (cents/mi.)
1.03 – 1.25
1.26 – 1.50
1.51 – 1.75
1.76 – 2.00
2.01 – 2.25
2.26 – 2.50
2.51 – 3.00
3.01 – 3.50
3.51 – 4.32

Electric vehicle
damage (cents/mi.)
0.674 – 1.25
1.26 – 1.50
1.51 – 1.75
1.76 – 2.00
2.01 – 2.25
2.26 – 2.50
2.51 – 3.00
3.01 – 3.50
3.51 – 4.72

Figure 1. Marginal Damages for Gas and Electric Vehicles by County

III. Results

A. Environmental Benefits of Electric Vehicles
The environmental benefits of electric vehicles depend on the difference between
damages from gasoline and electric vehicles. We begin with damages from electric
vehicles. The bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates our baseline estimates of the damages (in cents per mile) for the 2014 electric Ford Focus by county.41 The variation
41

See online Appendix Q for full page color versions of all figures.
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Table 1—Mean Damages in Cents per Mile by Electricity Demand Region for a 2014 Ford Focus
Electric Vehicle for Different Charging Profiles
Region

EPRI

Flat

Hr
1–4

Hr
5–8

Hr
9–12

Hr
13–16

Hr
17–20

Hr
21–24

VMT
(%)

California
WECC w/o CA
ERCOT
SPP
FRCC
SERC
NPCC
RFC
MISO & MRO

0.69
1.03
1.28
2.24
2.48
2.75
3.11
3.64
4.29

0.75
0.92
1.21
2.74
2.14
2.67
2.75
3.55
3.52

0.65
1.18
1.50
2.07
3.21
2.75
4.19
3.42
5.63

0.78
0.98
1.41
4.91
2.36
2.26
3.75
3.38
3.91

0.78
0.84
1.10
2.30
2.25
2.72
1.61
3.83
3.03

0.84
0.76
1.07
2.89
1.39
2.96
2.12
3.06
2.57

0.82
0.73
1.05
2.39
1.53
2.63
2.49
3.43
2.32

0.64
0.99
1.16
1.89
2.11
2.71
2.35
4.15
3.69

11
11
7
4
6
22
9
17
14

Total

2.59

2.41

2.90

2.56

2.28

2.15

2.12

2.46

100

Notes: The regions are ordered by the damage per mile under the EPRI charging profile. The EPRI charging profile is illustrated in Figure B in online Appendix F; the flat charging profile assumes charging is equally likely
across hours; and other profiles assume charging occurs only in the indicated hours. Damages (in cents per mile)
are weighted across counties by passenger vehicle VMT. California is the California ISO; WECC w/o CA is the
Western United States excluding California; ERCOT is Texas; SPP is Kansas and Oklahoma; FRCC is Florida;
SERC is the Southeast; NPCC is the Northeast; RFC is the Mid-Atlantic and Midwest; and MISO & MRO is the
upper Midwest. See Figure C in online Appendix H for a map of the regions.

is largely driven by the NERC regions, although damages do vary within a region
due to our c ounty-specific temperature correction.
Table 1 summarizes the data in Figure 1 and shows sensitivity with respect to
charging profiles.42 In the baseline EPRI profile, mean damages are 2.6 cents per
mile (the equivalent of 8.1 cents per kWh) but range from $0.01 or less per mile in
California and the West (WECC) to over $0.04 per mile in the Midwest (MISO and
MRO). These regional differences in emissions reflect the pollution intensity of the
fuels used in each region’s generating capacity as well as its electricity imports from
other regions. There is some variation in damages across the charging profiles. Our
baseline results are based on the EPRI charging profile, in which most electric vehicle charging occurs at night. However, damages could be reduced in the Midwest
(MISO and MRO) by over 1.5 cents per mile by charging between 1 pm and 4 pm,
for example. But generally, variation across charging profiles is much smaller than
the variation across NERC regions.
The left columns of panel A in Table 2 summarize the distribution of damages
across counties for the electric Ford Focus as well as all other 2014 model year
electric vehicles. For the electric Ford Focus, the mean is 2.59 cents per mile with
a range from under $0.01 (in the West) to almost $0.05 (in the Midwest). The difference across vehicles is due solely to differences in their efficiency (in kWh per
mile). For example, the BYD e6 (the dirtiest electric vehicle) uses approximately
twice as many kWh per mile as the Chevy Spark (the cleanest electric vehicle).
Correspondingly, the mean, minimum, and maximum damages of the BYD e6 are
approximately double those of the Chevy Spark.
We now turn to the damages from gasoline vehicles. The top panel of Figure 1
illustrates the damages (in cents per mile) for the gasoline Ford Focus by county.
42

All results are in 2014$ and all summary statistics are weighted by VMT.
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Table 2—Summary Statistics of Damages and Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile for 2014
Electric Vehicles and Substitute 2014 Gasoline Vehicles across Counties
Electric vehicle
Vehicle

Mean

Panel A. Damages and environmental benefits
Chevy Spark
2.28
Honda Fit
2.30
Fiat 500e
2.34
Nissan Leaf
2.38
Mitsubishi i-Miev
2.42
Smart fortwo
2.54
Ford Focus
2.59
2.82
Tesla S (60 kWh)
3.06
Tesla S (85 kWh)
Toyota Rav4
3.58
BYD e6
4.35

Gasoline vehicle

Max

Mean

Min

Max

Mean

Min

Max

0.59
0.60
0.61
0.62
0.63
0.66
0.67
0.73
0.80
0.93
1.13

4.17
4.20
4.27
4.35
4.41
4.63
4.72
5.15
5.59
6.52
7.94

1.69
1.93
1.74
1.23
1.69
1.67
1.86
2.44
2.67
2.09
2.09

0.95
1.13
0.93
0.74
0.95
0.98
1.03
1.28
1.48
1.20
1.20

4.30
4.83
4.62
3.53
4.30
4.50
4.32
5.48
5.74
5.02
5.02

−0.60
−0.37
−0.60
−1.16
−0.73
−0.87
−0.73
−0.38
−0.39
−1.49
−2.27

−3.15
−3.00
−3.26
−3.52
−3.40
−3.57
−3.63
−3.78
−4.02
−5.23
−6.64

3.08
3.60
3.33
2.22
3.05
3.13
3.16
4.28
4.55
3.50
3.30

Environmental
benefits
Vehicle

Mean

Environmental benefits

Min

Min

Global environmental
benefits
Max

Mean

Min

Local environmental
benefits

Max

Mean

Min

Max

Panel B. Decomposition of environmental benefits into global and local environmental benefits
Chevy Spark
3.08
0.35 −0.14
0.72
−0.60 −3.15
Honda Fit
3.60
0.52
0.02
0.89
−0.37 −3.00
Fiat 500e
3.33
0.32 −0.19
0.71
−0.60 −3.26
Nissan Leaf
2.22
0.28
−1.16 −3.52
−0.09 −0.40
Mitsubishi i-Miev
3.05
0.30 −0.21
0.69
−0.73 −3.40
Smart fortwo
3.13
0.18 −0.24
0.57
−0.87 −3.57
Ford Focus
3.16
0.44 −0.21
0.89
−0.73 −3.63
4.28
0.83
-0.07
1.36
Tesla S (60 kWh)
−0.38 −3.78
4.55
0.96
0.01
1.54
Tesla S (85 kWh)
−0.39 −4.02
Toyota Rav4
3.50
0.23 −0.51
0.81
−1.49 −5.23
BYD e6
3.30
0.65
−2.27 −6.64
−0.04 −0.88

−0.95
−0.89
−0.92
−1.07
−1.04
−1.06
−1.17
−1.21
−1.36
−1.72
−2.23

−3.01
−3.02
−3.08
−3.16
−3.20
−3.34
−3.43
−3.72
−4.04
−4.73
−5.78

2.37
2.71
2.63
1.99
2.36
2.57
2.28
2.93
3.02
2.71
2.66

Notes: Damages are from power plant emissions or tailpipe emissions of NOx, VOCs, PM2.5, SO2, and CO2. Electric
vehicles assume the EPRI charging profile. Substitute vehicles are defined as the identical make where possible.
The substitute vehicle for the Nissan Leaf is the Toyota Prius; for the Mitsubishi i-Miev is the Chevy Spark; for the
Tesla Model S is the BMW 740 or 750; and for the BYD e6 is the Toyota Rav4. Damages are in cents per mile and
are weighted across counties by VMT.

The counties with large damages correspond to major population centers because
air pollution damages are mostly comprised of premature mortality risks. These
damages are summarized in the middle columns of panel A in Table 2. For the gasoline Ford Focus, mean damages are 1.86 cents per mile (the equivalent of $0.51 per
gallon) but range from about $0.01 per mile to over $0.04 per mile.43
Notice that there is substantial overlap in the distributions of damages from
gasoline and electric vehicles. If these damages were highly correlated, then the
environmental benefits of an electric vehicle would be small in most counties. In
fact, the damages are not highly correlated (the correlation is 0.07). As a result, the
environmental benefits vary substantially, as shown in the right columns of panel A
in Table 2. For example, gasoline vehicle damages are large in Los Angeles (due
to the large population and properties of the airshed) but electric vehicle damages
are small (due to the clean Western power grid). In this situation, the environmental benefits are almost equal to gasoline damages (i.e., $0.03 to $0.04 per mile)
and hence electric vehicles have substantial environmental benefits. The opposite
occurs in the upper Midwest where gasoline vehicle damages are small (due to low
43

Mean damages per gallon of gasoline range from $0.48 to $0.62 across the vehicles. For the Ford Focus,
damages across counties range from $0.37 to $1.12 per gallon.
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Electric vehicle subsidy
($/car)

−5,445 – −3,000
−2,999 – −2,000
−1,999 – −1,000
−999 – 0

1 – 1,000
1,001 – 2,000
2,001 – 3,000
3,001 – 4,743

Figure 2. Second-Best Electric Vehicle Subsidy by County

population densities) but electric vehicle damages are large (due to the prevalence of
coal-fired generation in the region and the temperature adjustment to electric vehicle
range). Here the environmental benefits of an electric vehicle are negative, and are
almost equal to the electric vehicle damages. Overall, the environmental benefits
are negative on average for each of the electric vehicles in Table 2, panel A.44 The
electric Ford Focus is the median electric vehicle in terms of environmental benefits,
and we focus on it throughout the results section.
Panel B in Table 2 decomposes the environmental benefits into global benefits
and local benefits. Just about every electric vehicle, in just about every place, creates global environmental benefits relative to gasoline vehicles. In contrast, the local
environmental benefits from electric vehicles can be positive or negative depending
on the place. But on average, for all electric vehicles, the negative local environmental benefits outweighs the positive global environmental benefits. Focusing solely on
global environmental benefits provides a misleading impression of the environmental consequences of electric vehicles.45
Using Proposition 2, we can convert the environmental benefits into the
second-best purchase subsidy by assuming that both the electric vehicle and the gasoline vehicle are driven 150,000 miles.46 Figure 2 shows the s econd-best subsidies
by county. Except for a few counties around New York City and Atlanta, the subsidy
is negative throughout the eastern part of the country (i.e., it is a tax on the purchase
44
This is due in large part to the fact that only 30 percent of the VMT occurs in the three regions with the lowest
marginal damages from electricity (see the last column of Table 1).
45
Several prominent online sites that compare gasoline and electric vehicles (EPA, Union of Concerned
Scientists) only consider global environmental benefits.
46
We assume both vehicles have ten year lifetimes, regardless of the number of miles driven, and that both are
driven 15,000 miles a year in the absence of any taxes on miles. In practice, vehicle life depends on both years and
miles driven. Moreover, it is not clear whether electric vehicles will be driven more (due to lower costs per mile) or
less (due to the inconvenience of charging) than gasoline vehicles.
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Table 3—Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile by Metropolitan Statistical Areas for a 2014
Ford Focus (Electric versus Gasoline)

Metropolitan statistical area
Highest benefit MSAs
Los Angeles, CA
Oakland, CA
San Jose, CA
San Francisco, CA
Santa Ana, CA
Other high VMT MSAs
San Diego, CA
Riverside, CA
Phoenix, AZ
Houston, TX
Dallas, TX
New York, NY
Atlanta, GA
Chicago, IL
Washington, DC-VA
Minneapolis, MN
US and nonurban
US average
Nonurban
Lowest benefit MSAs
St. Cloud, MN
Bismarck, ND
Fargo, ND-MN
Duluth, MN-WI
Grand Forks, ND-MN

Environmental
benefits per
mile

VMT
(percent)

Damage
per mile
(gasoline)

Damage
per mile
(electric)

3.16
2.21
2.11
1.91
1.87

2.69
0.75
0.54
0.45
0.93

3.85
2.89
2.80
2.59
2.54

0.69
0.68
0.69
0.68
0.67

$4,743
$3,315
$3,166
$2,867
$2,800

1.85
1.17
0.74
0.67
0.62
−0.02
−0.36
−0.74
−0.89
−2.39

0.97
1.35
1.16
1.74
1.52
1.97
1.92
1.75
1.40
1.06

2.53
1.88
1.77
2.01
1.91
3.16
2.38
2.98
2.19
2.08

0.68
0.71
1.03
1.35
1.29
3.18
2.73
3.72
3.08
4.46

$2,770
$1,756
$1,112
$1,003
$926
−$32
−$535
−$1,116
−$1,335
−$3,578

−0.73
−1.67

100
20

1.86
1.20

2.59
2.87

−$1,095
−$2,500

−2.87
−2.97
−3.07
−3.09
−3.14

0.08
0.04
0.07
0.10
0.03

1.62
1.52
1.54
1.47
1.52

4.49
4.49
4.61
4.56
4.66

−$4,310
−$4,456
−$4,605
−$4,635
−$4,711

Purchase
subsidy

Notes: The environmental benefits are the difference in damages between the gasoline-powered Ford Focus and the
electric Ford Focus. Environmental benefits are weighted by VMT by county within each MSA. Nonurban includes
all counties that are not part of an MSA. The purchase subsidy assumes vehicle is driven 150,000 miles.

of electric vehicles). The subsidy is large and negative in the upper Midwest. On the
other hand, it is positive in most places in the West, and quite large in many counties
in California. Overall, the s econd-best subsidy ranges from about positive $5,000 to
negative $5,000.
In Table 3, we aggregate to the level of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).
The MSAs with the highest environmental benefits are all in California because
electricity generation in the West does not produce much air pollution. In these
MSAs, the environmental benefits are about $0.02 to $0.03 per mile (a second-best
subsidy of up to $5,000). The MSAs with the lowest environmental benefits are all
in the upper Midwest, again because of the prevalence of c oal-fired power stations.
Here the environmental benefits are −$0.03 per mile (a s econd-best purchase tax of
about $4,000). Other large MSAs can have either positive or negative environmental
benefits. New York and Chicago have some of the largest damages from gasoline
vehicles, but environmental benefits from electric vehicles are small or negative
due to the large damages from electric vehicles. Electric vehicles have substantial environmental benefits in the major Texas MSAs, due to relatively low electric
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Table 4—Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile by State for a 2014 Ford Focus
(Electric versus Gasoline)

State
Highest benefit states
California
Utah
Colorado
Arizona
Washington
Other high VMT states
Texas
Florida
Georgia
New York
North Carolina
Virginia
Illinois
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Lowest benefit states
South Dakota
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Iowa
North Dakota
US average

Environmental
benefits per
mile

VMT
(percent)

Damage
per mile
(gasoline)

Damage
per mile
(electric)

1.86
0.73
0.60
0.59
0.58

11
1
2
2
2

2.55
1.77
1.63
1.62
1.59

0.69
1.04
1.03
1.02
1.02

$2,785
$1,089
$902
$889
$865

0.34
−0.70
−0.78
−0.91
−1.07
−1.20
−1.56
−1.76
−1.78
−2.48

8
7
4
5
4
3
3
4
3
3

1.75
1.80
1.96
2.19
1.67
1.72
2.31
1.89
1.86
1.76

1.41
2.49
2.74
3.10
2.74
2.93
3.87
3.65
3.64
4.24

$505
−$1,049
−$1,166
−$1,371
−$1,611
−$1,807
−$2,345
−$2,640
−$2,675
−$3,720

−2.66
−2.76
−2.79
−2.93
−3.31

0
2
2
1
0

1.27
1.72
1.59
1.37
1.27

3.93
4.48
4.37
4.30
4.58

−$3,992
−$4,145
−$4,180
−$4,394
−$4,964

−0.73

100

1.86

2.59

−$1,095

Purchase
subsidy

Notes: The environmental benefits are the difference in damages between the gasoline-powered Ford Focus and the
electric Ford Focus. Environmental benefits are weighted by gasoline-vehicle VMT within each state. The purchase
subsidy assumes the vehicle is driven 150,000 miles.

v ehicle d amages in Texas. However, for n onurban regions as well as for MSAs in the
Southeast, Northeast, and Midwest, the benefits from electric vehicles are negative.
Table 4 contains a similar analysis at the state level. Compared to MSAs, the environmental benefits of electric vehicles are smaller at the state level because of negative benefits in nonurban areas. The largest environmental benefits are in California
(a second-best subsidy of $3,000) and other Western states. The lowest benefits are
in the upper Midwest (a second-best tax of almost $5,000 in North Dakota). There
are only 11 states in which the environmental benefits are positive, and Texas is the
only high VMT state outside the Western interconnection in which the environmental benefits are positive. The top panel of Figure 3 shows the second-best purchase
subsidy by state. When driven in the average state, a 2014 electric Ford Focus causes
$1,095 more environmental damages over its driving lifetime than the equivalent
gasoline Ford Focus.47

47
Although our main focus is on variation from this average, and the main focus in Michalek et al. (2011) is on
life-cycle costs, we can compare our results to theirs. They find, on average, a battery electric vehicle causes $181
more environmental damages over its driving lifetime than a gasoline vehicle. See online Appendix O for details.
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Electric vehicle subsidy
($/car)

−4,964 – −3,000
−2,999 – −2,000
−1,999 – −1,000
−999 – 500
−499 – 0
1 – 500

501 – 1,000
1,001 – 2,000
2,001 – 3,000

Native electric
vehicle subsidy ($/car)

−4,964 – −3,000
−2,999 – −2,000
−1,999 – −1,000
−999 – 500
−499 – 0
1 – 500

501 – 1,000
1,001 – 2,000
2,001 – 3,000

Figure 3. Second-Best Electric Vehicle Subsidy by State (Full and Native Damages)

B. Exporting Pollution: Full and Native Damages
Although both gasoline and electric vehicles export pollution, electric vehicles
export pollution to a remarkable degree (the grid itself is distributed and emissions
from power plants are released from tall smokestacks intended to disperse pollutants over a wide area).48 To illustrate this discrepancy, we first analyze transport
of a specific pollutant from a specific county. The top panel in Figure 4 illustrates
the change in PM2.5 associated with driving gasoline-powered Ford Focus vehicles
48

Similarly, any electricity consuming good will export pollution.
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Change PM2.5 (ug/m^3)
0.000 – 0.001
0.002 – 0.010
0.011 – 0.050
0.051 – 0.100
0.101 – 0.500
0.501 – 1.000
1.001 – 2.270

Change PM2.5 (ug/m^3)
0.000 – 0.001
0.002 – 0.010
0.011 – 0.050
0.051 – 0.100
0.101 – 0.500
0.501 – 1.000
1.001 – 2.270

Figure 4. Change in PM2.5 from Gasoline versus Electric Vehicle in Fulton County, Georgia
Notes: The top panel illustrates the change in PM2.5 associated with a fleet of 10,000 gasoline-powdered Ford Focus
vehicles, each driven 15,000 miles in a year in Fulton County. The bottom panel illustrates the change in PM2.5 associated with the same number of miles driven by electric powered Ford Focus vehicles charged in Fulton County,
thereby increasing the consumption of electricity in the United States (SERC).

in Fulton County, Georgia. Most of the increase in PM2.5 is centered within a few
nearby counties. The bottom panel in Figure 4 shows the change in PM2.5 associated
with equivalent driving by electric powered Ford Focus vehicles charged in the same
county. The spatial footprint of PM2.5in this case encompasses the entire eastern
United States.49

49

In the online supplementary material, we present similar maps for the 20 largest MSAs.
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Table 5—Native Damages in Cents per Mile by State and County and Export Percentages
Vehicle

Damages

Mean

Med.

SD

Min

Max

Electric

All
Non-GHG
State
Export percent
County
Export percent

2.59
1.70
0.15
91
0.02
99

2.74
1.86
0.16
91
0.02
99

1.18
1.02
0.07

0.67
0.16
0.04

0.01

0.00

4.72
3.50
0.33
91
0.06
98

All
Non-GHG
State
Export percent
County
Export percent

1.86
0.53
0.43
19
0.23
57

1.76
0.36
0.26
28
0.10
72

0.59
0.52
0.51

1.03
0.01
0.00

0.37

0.00

−0.73
−1.17
0.28
0.21

−1.01
−1.48
0.12
0.08

1.39
1.19
0.51
0.37

−3.63
−3.43
−0.32
−0.06

Gasoline

Environmental benefits

All
Non-GHG
State
County

4.32
2.92
2.76
5
2.03
30
3.16
2.28
2.46
2.00

Notes: Damages in cents per mile. All reports damages from all pollutants at all receptors. Non-GHG reports damages from local pollutants (i.e., excluding CO2) at all receptors. State reports damages from local pollutants from
receptors within the same state as the source. County reports damages from local pollutants from receptors within
the same county as the source. State Export percent reports the share of non-GHG damages which occur at receptors
outside the state. County Export percent reports the share of non-GHG damages which occur at receptors outside
the county. Electric damages assume the EPRI charging profile. Damages are weighted by VMT.

Our definition of native damages allows a more comprehensive analysis of pollution export. Table 5 shows native damages at both the state and county levels for both
electric and gasoline vehicles. For electric vehicles, full damages from local pollutants are 1.7 cents per mile on average. Native state damages are only 0.15 cents per
mile, and native county damages are only 0.02 cents per mile. Thus on average 91
percent of electric vehicle damages from local pollutants are exported from the state
and 99 percent are exported from the county. Local damages from gasoline vehicles
are exported to a much smaller extent. On average only 19 percent of these damages
are exported from a state and only 57 percent are exported from a county.
Using native damages rather than full damages changes the environmental benefits calculation quite dramatically, especially at the lower tail of the distribution. In
this lower tail, gasoline full damages are small and electric full damages are large.
Because most electric vehicle damages are exported, both native gasoline damages
and native electric damages are small. This implies that the lower tail of environmental benefits moves from approximately −3.6 cents per mile to approximately
−0.06 cents per mile for c ounty-level native damages. In contrast, at the upper tail
of the distribution, electric vehicle damages were already low, so accounting for
native damages has a smaller impact on the environmental benefits. On average, the
environmental benefits calculated using native damages is positive at both the state
and county level. Correspondingly, as illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 3, the
state level second-best purchase subsidy, using native damages, is positive in 32 out
of 48 states.
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Do state policymakers place greater emphasis on full or native damages when
considering electric vehicle subsidies? A number of states have implemented subsidies for the adoption of electric vehicles, above and beyond the federal subsidy,
such as California ($2,500), Colorado ($6,000), Georgia ($5,000), Illinois ($4,000),
and Maryland ($3,000). In addition, some states offer a variety of other incentives,
including carpool lane access, electricity discounts, and parking benefits.50 As
shown in online Appendix J, both actual subsidies and the number of other incentives are more highly correlated with our calculated native damage subsidy than
with our calculated full damage subsidy. This evidence suggests that native damages
may help explain state policymakers’ support for electric vehicle subsidies.
C. State and County Differentiated Policies
Our analysis shows that the environmental benefits of electric vehicles vary substantially across locations. This raises the question of whether differentiated policies
can lead to large enough welfare gains to offset any additional implementation costs.
To illustrate these welfare gains, we calibrate the discrete choice model developed
in Section II.51 In addition to electric vehicle purchase subsidies, we also consider
fuel-specific taxes on miles driven (i.e., VMT taxes), because such taxes at the
county level correspond to first-best policy in our model. Some care must be taken
with the interpretation of these results, because they rely on a number of assumptions and specific functional forms. Nevertheless, they illustrate the complexity of
comparing the gains from differentiation across different policies.
Panel A in Table 6 shows the deadweight losses for differentiated VMT tax policies. C
 ounty-specific taxes on electric miles and gasoline miles set at the Pigovian
levels te  i  = δeiand tg  i  = δgihave zero deadweight loss. To calculate deadweight
losses of other policies, we need to specify the share of new vehicle purchases that
would be electric under a default policy in which there is no subsidy at all (or business as usual). If the share would be 2 percent, we refer to this as the 2 percent BAU
EV share case. We consider 1 percent, 2 percent, and 5 percent shares. Even at a
5 percent share, the electricity used to charge the vehicles is a small percentage of
the overall variation in electricity load (see online Appendix M). Given a 2 percent
BAU EV share, s tate-specific taxes have a deadweight loss of $92 million per year,
and uniform federal taxes have a deadweight loss of $191 million per year.52 This
implies a gain from differentiation of $100 million (moving from federal to state)
and of $191 million (moving from federal to county). The middle and right columns
of panel A in Table 6 show differentiated policies in which there is only a single
tax on one of the fuels. The second-best single tax is smaller than the Pigovian tax,
because consumers can avoid taxation by substituting into the untaxed vehicle (see
online Appendix L). For single tax policies, the gains from differentiation are on the
order of $25–$200 million. However, the deadweight losses are large particularly for
taxes on electric miles only ($1.7 billion). The last three rows of panel A in Table 6
50
The Department of Energy maintains a database of alternative fuels policies by state (http://www.afdc.
energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=tech). A few states impose a special registration fee for electric vehicles. Our data
accounts for policies in place on July 28, 2014.
51
See online Appendix K for more details.
52
For context, annual vehicle sales are approximately 15 million in the United States.
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Table 6—Deadweight Losses of Differentiated VMT Taxes and Differentiated Purchase Subsidies

Panel A. Deadweight losses
of differentiated VMT taxes
County policies
State policies
Federal policies
County (native)
State (native)
Federal (native)

Gas and electric tax
BAU EV share
percent

Gas tax only
BAU EV share
percent

Electric tax only
BAU EV share
percent

1

2

5

1

2

5

1

2

5

0
89
162
989
1,067
778

0
92
191
1,073
1,153
809

0
102
277
1,325
1,412
903

201
289
343

391
482
542

905
1,005
1,095

1,709
1,712
1,736

1,717
1,721
1,770

1,740
1,752
1,874

BAU EV share
percent
Panel B. Deadweight losses of differentiated electric vehicle purchase subsidies
County policies
State policies
Federal policies (−$1,095 subsidy)
County policies (native damages)
State policies (native damages)
Federal policies (native damages)
Current federal policy ($7,500 subsidy)
BAU federal policy (zero subsidy)

1

2

5

1,754
1,758
1,783
1,788
1,792
1,785
2,581
1,791

1,806
1,815
1,864
1,874
1,881
1,868
3,459
1,880

1,960
1,983
2,107
2,134
2,152
2,188
6,079
2,148

Notes: Deadweight loss in millions of dollars per year is based on 15 million annual vehicle sales normalized to the
emissions profile of the Ford Focus. The BAU EV share is the proportion of electric vehicles sold if there were no
subsidy. This share is determined by the assumed value for μ (10,664, 10,508, 10,037) which is proportional to the
standard deviation of the unobserved relative preference shock. In panel A, federal taxes in the joint tax case are
1.9 cents per mile on gasoline miles and 2.6 cents per mile on electric miles.

show differentiated taxes based on native damages. The gains from differentiation
are small or even negative. These policies lead to large deadweight losses ($0.7–
$1.5 billion), because taxes based on native damages are much too low.
Panel B in Table 6 shows the deadweight losses for differentiated electric vehicle
purchase subsidies. Gains from differentiation are relatively small: on the order of
$10–$60 million at a 2 percent BAU EV share. These gains are much smaller than
the gains from differentiation of VMT taxes. The distribution of environmental benefits is right skewed. Because the probability of adopting the gas vehicle is close to
one, it follows from Proposition 2 that this skewness leads to an increase in the gains
from differentiation. Deadweight losses from electric vehicle subsidies are large:
around $1.8 billion per year. Electric vehicle subsidies based on native damages
have similarly large deadweight losses and small gains from differentiation.
Finally, panel B in Table 6 shows the deadweight loss from the current federal
policy of a $7,500 subsidy on the purchase on an electric vehicle and the deadweight
loss from the default no-subsidy policy. The deadweight loss from the current federal subsidy is $3.4 billion per year at a 2 percent BAU EV share. This exceeds the
deadweight loss from the no-subsidy policy by $1.6 billion per year. The BAU EV
shares shown in the table represent plausible shares in the near future and are appropriate for evaluating policy looking forward. To evaluate the recent past, we calculate
deadweight losses of the two policies for a BAU EV share of 0.375 percent which
is consistent with the actual 2014 electric vehicle market share of approximately
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0.75 percent.53 The deadweight loss from the current federal subsidy is $2.0 billion
and the deadweight loss from the n o-subsidy policy is $1.7 billion. Regardless of
BAU EV share, the current federal subsidy has larger deadweight loss than the no
subsidy policy. And the welfare difference between the two polices increases substantially as the BAU EV share increases.
D. Sensitivity Analysis
Our analysis takes data from a number of different sources, uses estimated coefficients from regressions in the electricity model and the AP2 model, and makes
assumptions about variables such as charging behavior and the effects of temperature on electric vehicle range. Although there is uncertainty associated with each
of these factors, we do not attempt to assign standard errors to our results. Instead
we perform a sensitivity analysis to see the effects of various deviations from our
baseline model.54
The first parameter that we explore in Table 7 is the social cost of carbon (SCC).
Our baseline value is $41. A higher value for the SCC leads to higher damage estimates for both electric and gasoline vehicles, but the environmental benefits are not
highly sensitive to the assumed SCC.
Several of our assumptions affect only one type of vehicle. On the electric side,
our baseline calculation makes a temperature adjustment to account for the reduced
performance of electric vehicles in weather extremes and uses the EPRI charging
profile. Table 7 shows that our results are not sensitive to these choices. On the gasoline side, our baseline calculation differentiates the mpg of gasoline vehicles by city
and highway driving and assumes emissions throughout the lifetime of the vehicle
are the same as when new. Using an average mpg instead leads to slightly lower
gasoline vehicle damages. Doubling emissions rates for local pollutants primarily
affects the upper tail of the gasoline vehicle damages and hence the upper tail of the
environmental benefits.
Another set of assumptions relate to parameters in the AP2 model. In particular,
in the baseline case, AP2 uses a VSL of approximately $8.1 million. A lower VSL
of about $2.7 million leads to lower damages for both electric and gasoline vehicles
and hence a narrower distribution for the environmental benefits. Another important
parameter in AP2 is the dose-response function that links PM2.5 exposure to adult
mortality. We find that a higher dose response parameter leads to higher damages for
both vehicles which widens the distribution of environmental benefits.
The next calculation examines changes to the electricity grid and the gasoline
vehicle fleet. Our baseline uses observed power plant emissions in 2010–2012 to
estimate the damages from electric vehicles. New air pollution and climate regulations on power plants will likely lead to lower emissions in the future. In addition,
there is an ongoing transition from coal plants to gas plants. For a rough estimate of
these effects, we model a power grid in which all of the c oal-fired power plants are
replaced with new gas-fired power plants. This procedure implies that the replacement plants would be in the same locations and would be dispatched identically to
53
54

Li et al. (forthcoming) estimate that 50 percent of electric vehicle sales are due to the subsidy.
Additional sensitivity for the welfare analysis is in online Appendix K.
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Table 7—Sensitivity Analysis of Damages and Environmental Benefits in Cents per Mile for 2014
Electric and Gasoline Ford Focus
Electric vehicle

Gasoline vehicle

Environmental benefits

Mean

Min

Max

Mean

Min

Max

Mean

Min

Max

Baseline

2.59

0.67

4.72

1.86

1.03

4.32

−3.63

3.16

Carbon cost
SCC = $51
SCC = $31

−0.73

2.80
2.37

0.80
0.55

5.02
4.42

2.18
1.53

1.28
0.78

4.67
3.98

−0.62
−0.84

−3.68
−3.58

3.38
2.95

No temperature adjustment

2.43

0.67

3.90

1.86

1.03

4.32

Flat charging profile

2.41

0.74

3.88

1.86

1.03

4.32

Average mpg

2.59

0.67

4.72

1.74

1.23

4.11

Double gasoline emission rates

2.59

0.67

4.72

2.39

1.05

7.24

$2.7 Million VSL

1.61

0.71

2.64

1.54

1.02

2.55

PM dose response

3.74

1.25

6.89

2.16

1.04

5.96

Future grid & vehicle

0.67

0.37

1.39

1.23

0.74

3.53

High estimates ∗

2.65

0.69

4.46

2.13

1.15

3.90

2.53

0.68

4.15

1.59

0.78

2.90

Low estimates ∗

−0.57

−0.55

−0.85

−0.20

−0.06

−1.58
0.56

−0.52

−0.94

−2.84

−2.79

−3.42

−3.58

−1.59

−5.76

−0.57

−2.86

−3.12

3.18
3.10
2.89
5.60
1.63
3.91
2.73
2.36
1.87

Notes: Baseline corresponds to Ford Focus row from panel A in Table 2. Carbon cost uses a social cost of carbon of $51 or $31. No temperature adjustment assumes electric vehicle range is independent of temperature. Flat
charging profile assumes electric vehicle charging occurs equally in all hours. Average mpg uses the average mpg
for the gasoline vehicle regardless of where it is driven. Double gasoline emissions rates doubles the gasoline vehicle emissions rates for local pollutants. $2.7 Million VSL assumes the VSL is $2.7 million instead of the baseline
$8.1 million. PM dose response assumes a higher PM2.5 adult-mortality dose-response from Roman et al. (2008).
Future grid & vehicle assumes all coal-fired power plants replaced by identically dispatched natural gas plants and
a Toyota Prius gasoline vehicle. High estimates assumes ninety-fifth percentile damages for all local pollutants for
all counties. Low estimates assumes fifth percentile damages for all local pollutants for all counties. ∗  indicates the
min and max counties are replaced by the fifth and ninety-fifth percentile counties.

the old c oal-fired plants.55 Turning to the gasoline vehicle fleet, our baseline uses
the gasoline Ford Focus as the comparison vehicle to the electric Ford Focus. New
regulations on gasoline vehicles will likely lead to lower emissions in the future.
For a rough estimate of these effects, we use the Toyota Prius as a proxy for the
vehicle of the future. The effect of these changes on the environmental benefits of
electric vehicles is given by the “Future grid and vehicle” row in Table 7. Damages
from both vehicles are lower, and damages from electric vehicles are much lower.
However the mean environmental benefits of 0.56 cents per mile implies an electric
vehicle subsidy of $840, which is still substantially less than current subsidies.
Finally, we consider statistical uncertainty associated with the marginal damages
produced by AP2 for both gas and electric vehicles. The procedure is described in
online Appendix I. The results using the fifth and n inety-fifth percentiles for the
damages are reported in Table 7.
IV. Caveats and Other Considerations

There are several important caveats to our calculation of the environmental
benefits of an electric vehicle due to decreased air pollution emissions. First, we
55
Modeling different plant locations and a new load curve is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Here
we scale the plant-specific coefficients for coal plants by a ratio. The numerator is the average emissions rate for
combined cycle gas turbine plants that started operating after 2007, namely their total emissions in 2010 over their
total net generation that year. The denominator is a similar emissions rate for each coal plant in our sample that is
not a co-generation plant.
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have only considered air pollution emissions associated with driving the vehicles.
There are other “upstream” environmental externalities associated with electric and
gasoline vehicles.56 It is unlikely, however, that these upstream externalities have
the same degree of heterogeneity found in the air pollution emissions from driving. So the effect of including them would likely be a shift in the distribution of
second-best subsidies but not a significant change in the variance of this distribution. Previous research has shown that electric vehicles have approximately $1,500
greater upstream externalities than gasoline vehicles (Michalek et al. 2011).57
Second, our analysis is based on a simple snapshot of the electricity grid in the
years 2010–2012. We might expect the grid to become cleaner over time by integrating new lower-emission fuels and technologies. Of course, gasoline vehicles may
become cleaner over time as well. The overall effect on the environmental benefits
of electric vehicles will depend on the relative rates of changes of these two factors.
Table 7 has an analysis of a future grid, but it is important to stress that our estimates
are based on the dispatch and emissions of the electricity grid in 2010–2012.
Third, we focus on the marginal emissions from an increase in the demand for
electric power due to electric vehicles charging. This is appropriate when the electricity demand for electric vehicles is a small fraction of overall electricity use. In
online Appendix M, we discuss large scale adoption of electric vehicles.
Fourth, we analyze the environmental benefits of electric vehicles in isolation
from other environmental regulations. In practice, these regulations may impact the
market for vehicles and/or the electricity market, and hence have an effect on the
environmental benefits of electric vehicles.58
Some regulations will have a negative effect on the environmental benefits of
electric vehicles. Consider the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.
CAFE stipulates that the s ales-weighted harmonic mean of mpg for a given manufacturer’s fleet of vehicles must meet a certain requirement. Electric vehicles are
assigned a mpg value for this calculation. These values are much larger than any
existing gasoline vehicle. Assuming that the CAFE requirement is initially binding,
selling an electric vehicle enables manufacturers to meet a lower standard for the
rest of their fleet. Let the CAFE-induced environmental cost of an electric vehicle
be defined as the increase in environmental damage from the rest of the fleet when
an electric vehicle is sold. In online Appendix N, we determine the CAFE-induced
environmental cost and show that the second-best subsidy on the purchase of an
electric vehicle is decreased by the amount of the C
 AFE-induced environmental
cost. Applying our baseline values for the Ford Focus, the CAFE-induced environmental cost is $1,555 per vehicle.59 This value is significant in comparison with even
the largest second-best subsidy for an electric vehicle found in our study ($2,785,
in California).

56
These include emissions from making vehicles and batteries, extracting oil, refining gasoline, transporting
gasoline to retail stations, mining coal and natural gas, and transporting these resources to electric plants.
57
See online Appendix O. See also Tamayao et al. (2015) and the references therein.
58
In addition, there may be preexisting distortions in both the electricity market (e.g., regulatory pricing policy)
and the gasoline market (e.g., OPEC).
59
A more thorough analysis would use a complete model of both supply and demand for the entire new vehicle
market and relax our assumption of constant prices. See also Jenn, Azevedo, and Michalek (2016).
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Other regulations, such as cap-and-trade programs and renewable portfolio standards (RPS), will have a positive effect on the environmental benefits. EPA programs cap emissions of NOx and SO2, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
caps emissions of CO2 in the Northeast. In our model of the electricity market, we
determine the marginal increase in emissions due to an increase in electricity consumption. We do not model the constraint that power plant emissions are capped.
During the period of our analysis, permit prices were exceedingly low in many markets, especially those for SO2. In all permit markets, the stock of banked allowances
was increasing significantly despite low prices. This suggests that the cap may not
have been binding in these markets.60 Nevertheless, in online Appendix P, we perform calculations to approximate the effect of binding caps. Under the assumption
that caps on NOx , SOx, and CO2 are all binding, damages from an electric vehicle
decrease from 2.59 cents per mile to 0.94 cents per mile (with 92 percent of this
decrease due to the cap on SO2). Equivalently, the s econd-best subsidy increases
from −$1,095 to $1,380. Turning to RPS, these programs require a fixed percentage
of electricity be produced by low emission technologies such as solar and wind. In a
region with a RPS, an increase in the electricity load will result in a increase in low
emission generation. Therefore, electric vehicle damages can be scaled by 1 − R  ,
where Ris the RPS share, if the renewables operate at the same time and location
as EV charging.
In addition to the environmental benefits studied in our paper, there are a variety
of other considerations that are put forth in favor of electric vehicle subsidies. First,
reducing the consumption of oil may generate geopolitical benefits, reduced military
expenditures, and economic benefits from insulation to oil price shocks. Michalek
et al. (2011) determined these benefits to be approximately $1,400. Notice that this
number has about the same magnitude, but the opposite sign, as the difference in
upstream externalities between electric and gasoline vehicles.
Second, electric vehicle subsidies may be justified due to innovation spillovers. If
innovation is a public good, then markets may provide too little innovation. Similarly,
the inability of firms to appropriate the full gains from innovation (e.g., consumers
may also benefit) may reduce innovation incentives. Our analysis cannot speak to
the appropriateness of these justifications for electric vehicle subsidies. However, it
is worth noting that electric vehicle subsidies are a “demand pull” innovation policy
and hence are subject to all the limitations of demand pull policies (Jaffe, Newell,
and Stavins 2005).
Third, subsidizing electric vehicles today helps boost demand, which in turn
increases incentives to provide electric vehicle charging infrastructure.61 The
increase in demand may also lead to lower production costs in the future due to
learning by doing. Both of these effects increase adoption in the future, which will
presumably be desirable due to a cleaner electric grid. This argument may indeed
have merit, but any such long-term benefits may be at least partially offset by the
short-term costs associated with current electric vehicle use. Our analysis provides
an estimate of these costs.
60

A nonbinding cap may still yield positive permit prices due to transactions costs.
Li et al. (forthcoming) examine the relative effectiveness of the current policy with alternative policies aimed
at building out the charging network.
61
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V. Conclusion

The comparison of environmental externalities from driving gasoline and electric
vehicles depends critically on damages from local pollution. Ignoring local pollution leads to an overestimate of the benefits of electric vehicles and an underestimate
of the geographic heterogeneity. Accounting for both global and local pollution, we
find electric vehicles generate negative environmental benefits of 0.73 cents per mile
on average relative to comparable gasoline vehicles. There is considerable variation
around this average: electric vehicles used in Los Angeles, California produce benefits of 3.2 cents per mile while those used in Grand Forks, North Dakota produce
benefits of −3.1 cents per mile. On average, electric vehicles driven in metropolitan
areas generate benefits of about $0.01 per mile while those driven outside metropolitan areas generate benefits of −1.7 cents per mile.
These findings raise questions regarding the sign, the magnitude, and the
one-size-fits-all nature of the uniform federal subsidy of $7,500 for purchasing a
pure electric vehicle. Our results imply subsidies of −$1,095 on average with a
range from $2,785 in California to −$4,964 in North Dakota. Thus environmental
benefits from driving cannot, alone, justify the federal subsidy. As discussed above,
other studies have estimated upstream environmental benefits of electric vehicles of
about −$1,500 and have estimated benefits of $1,400 due to reduced oil consumption. Combining these three factors cannot justify the federal subsidy. It remains an
open question as to whether or not additional considerations (such as innovation
spillovers, network effects, or learning by doing) generate enough benefits to justify
the federal subsidy.
At first blush, our finding of significant geographic heterogeneity in benefits suggests a need for local discretion. However, the pollution export phenomena we identify calls into question whether or not local regulation would be effective. In most
states, when a consumer opts for an electric vehicle rather than a gasoline vehicle,
they reduce air pollution in their state. However, in all but 11 states, this purchase
makes society as a whole worse off because electric vehicles tend to export air pollution to other states more than gasoline vehicles. Given this, states may implement
subsidies even though a tax might be more appropriate. Hence there may be a need
for federal policy to account for exported damages.
This suggests the appropriate policy for electric vehicles should be at the federal level, but differentiated by location. We find that differentiated Pigovian taxes
on miles lead to greater welfare gains than differentiated subsidies on vehicle purchases. This is not surprising, as economists have long recognized the superiority
of putting a direct price on externalities relative to other indirect corrective policies.
Unfortunately, this insight does not seem to have had much influence on policy, as
political decision makers often implement indirect policies instead. A consequence
of this predilection is that multiple indirect policies may target the same externalities, as is the case with CAFE standards and purchase subsidies on electric vehicles.
In our analysis, the interaction of these policies lead additional costs of $1,555 per
vehicle.
Public policy evaluation is especially difficult and important in contexts characterized by: (i) strong prior beliefs as to the merits of the policy and/or its targeted
outcome; (ii) complex interactions among economic and physical systems; and
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(iii) economically significant outcomes. The federal policy which encourages the
purchase of electric vehicles exhibits each of these traits. Although we have focused
on vehicles, there is a broader trend toward electrification of a variety of forms of
transportation. Our methodology, which combines d iscrete-choice models, distributed electricity generation, and air pollution models, may yield a useful template for
further analysis of the environmental consequences of this trend.
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